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This paper describes the development and implementation of analysis methods for identifying human factors safety
vulnerabilities associated with the mixed-fleet flying of the Boeing 767-400 and 777.  The results of the analysis
were two sets of vulnerabilities: those with potentially critical pilot performance consequences that should be further
tested, and those with minor consequences that should be considered when developing procedures and training for
the mixed-fleet flying program.  A longitudinal study was conducted that included data collection to address the
potentially critical vulnerabilities.  Examples of how vulnerabilities were addressed with video data from the study
are presented and conclusions from the analysis are described.
Introduction
The current economic environment for airlines is
causing them to consider all potential ways of
reducing operating costs while maintaining high
levels of safety.  One of the ways that a few airlines
have kept costs down is by flying only one type of
airplane.  This reduces training costs because pilots
do not have to be trained as they transition within the
airline to different airplanes.  It also provides
enhanced operational flexibility because any pilot can
fly any airplane in the fleet.  If there is a maintenance
problem with one airplane, the pilots that were going
to fly it will be able to fly any other airplane that the
airline has available.
Airlines that have more than one type of airplane
are looking into strategies for gaining some of the
benefits of the single-type airlines.  In hopes of
realizing these benefits they are exploring is the
possibility of mixed-fleet flying two or more
airplane types.  This means that the pilots would be
simultaneously qualified in multiple airplane types
and would be able to fly them indiscriminately as
needed by the airline.   Before such a program can
be  used  by  the  airlines,  however,  the  FAA  must
approve of their training and operations plan.  Prior
to FAA approval, the safety implications of the
proposed mixed-fleet flying program are analyzed
and  a  strategy  is  developed  to  mitigate  any
identified risks. Approval is given for a particular
combination of airplanes and a specific training and
operations program.
Airplane manufacturers are interested in mixed-fleet
flying because it provides value to their customers if
their airplanes can be flown by the same set of pilots.
Traditionally, the manufacturer provides information
to the FAA during certification of a new airplane
model  or  type  and  the  FAA  gives  approval  for  the
type of training that must occur if that new airplane is
flown with other models or types. At other times, the
manufacturer may wish to explore the mixed-fleet
flying option after an aircraft has been approved for
operation. The current study follows this strategy. In
this project, Boeing Airplane Company requested that
the FAA assess the mixing of the Boeing 767-400
and 777 aircraft.
The Operator Differences Requirements Table
includes details of differences between the designs of
the airplanes and, for each difference, whether the
difference results in flight characteristic changes or
procedural changes, and what level of training and
checking would be required at a minimum to address
the difference.
The psychology of human behavior shows that it is
not only the differences in airplane design that could
cause difficulty, but problems may also result from
similar designs that require different responses or
procedures (Braune, 1989; Holding, 1987).   The
present study focuses primarily on this latter
vulnerability as it relates to mixed-fleet flying. As
part of this effort, we developed a systematic
methodology for identifying and evaluating possible
instances of negative transfer based on the mixed-
fleet flying work by Lyall (1990).  This approach has
proven successful in its initial use and resulted in
providing information about safety vulnerabilities,
the potential for critical safety consequences, and
possible mitigation strategies.
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This paper describes the methodology; examples of
specific safety vulnerabilities that were identified;
and how the information can be used by airlines,
airplane manufacturers, and the FAA.
Vulnerability Analysis Methodology
The objective of the vulnerability analysis was to
identify pilot tasks for which there may be a potential
for error as a result of mixing the airplanes.  A full set of
pilot tasks that was developed by the airline for their
Advanced Qualification Program was used as the
foundation  of  the  analysis.   The  method  was  to
document for each task the situations and actions
required to accomplish the task on each airplane then
analyze the similarities and differences between the
airplanes, identifying potential vulnerabilities for pilot
performance that could result from mixing the airplanes.
The documentation began by gathering information
from the flight and training manuals for both
airplanes.  These manuals include normal and non-
normal procedures and checklists.  The information
from the manuals was then expanded using
interviews with pilots and instructors qualified on one
or both of the airplanes and, if necessary, conducting
directed sessions in simulators and training devices to
understand how the pilots may need to operate
differently in the two airplanes.  This analysis
resulted in a list of possible pilot performance
vulnerabilities.
A “vulnerability” was identified if the required action
or knowledge to accomplish a task was different in
the two airplanes.  Additionally, an item was
categorized as a “major” vulnerability if it consisted
of a critical behavior with safety consequences. All
major vulnerabilities were further investigated as part
of a separate analysis called the “longitudinal study.”
Analysis Results
Possible vulnerabilities that needed to be further
verified in the longitudinal study were identified for
19  tasks.   Minor  vulnerabilities  that  should  be
considered when updating training and procedures
were identified for 17 tasks.
The most safety critical design difference that was
discovered to have a vulnerability was the use of the
Takeoff/Go Around (TOGA) switch for
automatically advancing the thrust levers to takeoff
power.   The  TOGA  switch  is  used  in  three  tasks:
takeoff, missed approach, and rejected landing.  The
difference in design of the TOGA switch in the two
airplanes may lead to a classic negative transfer
situation because the tasks for which the switches are
used  are  the  same  in  the  two  airplanes,  but  the
response the pilots must make in using the switches is
different.   In  the  777  the  TOGA  switch  is  located
only  on  the  forward  side  of  the  thrust  levers  and
would, therefore, be activated with the pilots fingers
reaching forward and downward as the hand in on the
thrust lever.  The 777 TOGA switch is highlighted in
the picture in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Boeing 777 throttle quadrant with TOGA
switch highlighted.
On the 767-400, the TOGA switch can be activated
from both the forward and aft positions related to the
thrust levers.  During our analysis we interviewed
and observed several 767-400 pilots and instructors
in the simulator and found that 100% of them used
the  aft  TOGA  switch  exclusively.   This  gave  us
evidence that the difference in switch design could
lead to safety consequences when the pilots who had
habits formed in the 767-400 were flying the 777:
They could take longer in activating the TOGA
switch if they tried first to activate it at the aft of the
thrust  levers  and  had  to  realize  that  the  switch  was
not there before activating the forward switch.  We
knew that the consequences of this response
vulnerability had to be further investigated to
determine its criticality and we recommended that it
be included in determining the data to be collected in
the longitudinal study.
Another  example  of  a  vulnerability  that  was  further
investigated in the longitudinal study is related to the
engine start procedures.  The 777 is designed so that
both engines can be started simultaneously.  It also
has automated engine monitoring functions that alert
the pilots if the engines are not starting properly.  On
the 767-400 the engines must be started separately,
and the engine parameters must be monitored by the
pilots  to  ensure  a  safe  start.   In  our  analysis  process
we found that the 777 pilots still closely monitored
the engine status during start even though they had
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the assistance of the automation; however, they
always quickly started both engines, which would not
be appropriate in the 767-400.  Therefore, we
recommended monitoring the behavior of the 777
pilots when they started the 767-400 engines during
the longitudinal study.  In this case, the vulnerability
was  due  to  the  differences  in  system  logic  and  the
resulting procedures used by the pilots and not to a
difference in physical design characteristics.  In fact,
the controls used to start the engines were very
similar, and this was noted as making it more likely
that the pilots might perform the wrong behavior.
The minor vulnerabilities that were identified in the
analysis were communicated to the airline to consider
when developing training and procedures for their
mixed-fleet flying program involving these two
airplanes.  Several of these vulnerabilities were due
to the differences in the size of the two airplanes: The
777 is much larger in overall size and wing span than
the 767-400.  Because of this, there are several tasks
during which the pilots must consider the size
differences, and these differences are not necessarily
evident while sitting in the flight deck.  One example
is during taxi procedures: The pilots in the 777 must
ensure that they do not stop the airplane during a turn
when the wheels of the main gear are still cocked in a
turn.  The main gear wheels of the 767-400 do not
turn, so this is not a consideration on that airplane.
Therefore,  the  vulnerability  is  for  the  pilots  used  to
flying the 767-400 not monitoring the angle of the
main gear wheels while taxiing the 777.  This can be
information given to the pilots during training.  The
consequences are wear and tear on the main gear
assembly, but not safety related outcomes.
Verification of Vulnerabilities in Longitudinal Study
The scenarios and maneuvers used in the longitudinal
study included elements to test all the safety critical
vulnerabilities identified in the analysis.  The study
included pilot participants who were currently flying
one of the airplane types and had never flown the
other type.  Participants were 10 captains and 10 first
officers from each airplane, for a total of 40 pilots.
Longitudinal Study Design
The elements that make up this study are
• Simulator evaluation in current airplane
• Training in new airplane
• End-of-training simulator evaluation in new
airplane
• 90-day simulator evaluation in new airplane
• 180-day simulator evaluation in new
airplane
There were 10 crews per fleet (i.e., 10 crews were
current in the Boeing 777 and received training in the
Boeing 767-400 and 10 were current in the Boeing
767-400 and received training in the Boeing 777).
Each crew consisted of a captain and a first officer.
Half of the crews for each fleet were given a
simulator evaluation in their current aircraft before
any training began.  Immediately after training, all of
the  crews  were  given  a  simulator  evaluation  in  the
newly trained aircraft. All the crews then returned to
the  line  to  fly  their  normal  aircraft.  At  the  90-day
interval, half of the crews from each fleet were given
a simulator evaluation in the newly trained aircraft.
At  the  180-day  interval,  all  the  crews  were  given  a
simulator evaluation in the newly trained aircraft.
Pilot Training The training on the new airplane
consisted of two systems training modules, a written
systems evaluation, and five simulator training
modules.
Evaluation Development The protocol and content
for all evaluations were developed with input by the
Boeing  members  of  the  MFF  study  team  and  FAA
AEG inspectors.  It was determined that the
maneuvers  to  include  in  the  evaluations  should  be
those in the standard Appendix F required maneuvers
list, with a few exceptions.
Evaluation Protocol The evaluation profile consisted
of a line-oriented segment that included both crew
members followed by a maneuvers evaluation
segment that each of the participants flew separately.
An instructor pilot served as the pilot-not-flying
during  the  maneuvers  segment  to  control  for  the
possible confounding effects of having a non-
qualified MFF participant serving that role. Because
the instructors routinely serve this role during regular
training and evaluation, they are familiar with the
policy to neither help, nor hinder the pilot-flying
during the evaluation.
Evaluation Data Collected The evaluation data listed
in Table 1 was collected for each of the simulator
evaluation segments. The data collected were the
same for all evaluations.
The evaluation data were collected in the following
ways:
• Instructor/evaluators provide yes/no
assessments during the simulator
evaluations.  (Note: These assessments
were also verified later during the video
analysis.)
• Instructor/evaluators assign grades and
identify errors during the simulator
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evaluations (see Attachment 1 for
details).
• Pilots complete modified NASA TLX
worksheet assessment instruments
following each module to measure
perceived level of workload and provide
workload ratings.
• Research Integrations conducts video
analysis to collect data about the length
of time required to complete the after
landing checklist and the altitude at
autopilot disengagement.
Video Analysis
All  simulator  sessions  were  video  taped.   The  tapes
were received and organized by evaluation modules,
participant numbers, and participant positions
(captain or first officer).  The tapes were given
unique numerical identities (1 – 113).  The video
analysis focused on the tasks for which there were
safety critical vulnerabilities.  We will describe here
the analysis related to the use of the TOGA switch on
the  777.   Two  tasks  were  analyzed:  the  missed
approach at minimums and the rejected landing.
Hardware and software set up The video lab
consisted of the following hardware:
• Apple Macintosh Powerbook with OS X
• 2 – Lacie 500 Gigabyte external hard drives
• 1 – Lacie 250 Gigabyte external hard drives
• 1 – Sony 20 inch color television
• 1 – LXI Video Cassette Recorder
The video lab used the following software to digitize




The LXI video cassette recorder’s audio/video output
was connected to the Powerbook audio/video input
by a RCA cable consisting of left and right audio
lines and a video line.  All three Lacie External hard
drives were daisy chained together using FireWire
800 cables and connected to the Powerbook through
an iLink 6-to-4 pin cable.
Only the 777 tapes were digitized (45 in total), and an
excel file was created capturing all of the data for
each 777 tape.  The tapes were imported and
monitored to confirm:
• The proper functioning between VCR and
iMovies as well as importation of video
• The tape’s content corresponded accurately




• The video captured the entire simulation
session without interruption or failure
• Any discrepancies were investigated and
resolved
The file size for each digitized video tape was
approximately 15 Gigabytes
Two segments of the simulation video were isolated
for analysis: missed approach at minimums and
rejected landing at approximately 100 feet
In capturing clips of the missed approach:
• All clips were edited to begin just before the
airplane automated callout at “minimums.”
• All clips were edited to end after the “gear
up” callout by the pilot flying.
In capturing clips for the rejected landing
• Clips began just before the instructor
command to “go around.”
• Clips ended after the “gear up” call by the
pilot flying.
In measuring the reaction times for the missed
approach
• Reaction time began at the beginning “m” of
the airplane automated “minimums” callout.
• Reaction time ended at the point of first
observable hand or finger move going
forward to activate the TOGA switch.
In measuring reaction times for the rejected landing
• Reaction time began with the instructor
pronunciation of the “g” in “go around.”
• Reaction time ended at the point of first
observable hand or finger move going
forward to activate the TOGA switch.
The file size for each of the clips was approximately
35 Megabytes.
The following information was recorded for each of
the missed approach clips:
• Event time (duration of the clip)
• Reaction time for selecting TOGA
• Observations about how the pilot responded
when selecting the TOGA switch: no
hesitation, hesitation, went for aft button
first, anticipated, etc.
The following information was recorded for each of
the missed approach clips:
• Event time (duration of the clip)
• Reaction time for selecting TOGA
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• Observations about how the pilot responded
when selecting the TOGA switch
• Minimum altitude reached before climb out
The results of the video analysis show that there were
several pilots who tried to select the aft TOGA switch
when it was not there.  The reaction times for these
pilots were longer than for those who did not hesitate
when choosing the forward TOGA switch.  Figure 2
presents the numbers of pilots who reached for the aft
TOGA switch before the forward switch while doing
the missed approach.  Figure 3 presents the same
numbers for the rejected landing.



































Current airplane After training 90 days 180 days
Figure 2. Number of pilots who reached for the aft
TOGA switch during the missed approach for each
evaluation module.



































Current airplane After training 90 days 180 days
Figure 3. Number of pilots who reached for the aft
TOGA switch during the rejected landing for each
evaluation module.
Figure 4 shows the reaction times on the missed
approach for those pilots who went for the aft switch
first and those who went for the forward switch only.
Figure 5 shows the same data for the rejected landing.
The reaction times for the pilots who went for the aft
switch first are significantly longer than those who
directly activated the forward switch (both p < .01).























Figure 4. Reaction times for activating the TOGA
switch on the missed approach for pilots who
reached for the forward switch only and the aft
switch first.






















Figure 5. Reaction times for activating the TOGA
switch on the rejected landing for pilots who reached
for the forward switch only and the aft switch first.
These are the type of data that can be used to assess
the criticality of vulnerabilities.  It would be expected
that negative transfer would occur more likely occur
in situations that are unexpected and urgent or under
time pressure.  For the TOGA switch design
vulnerability, the data show that more pilots, even
those with current experience in the 777, reach for
the aft TOGA switch in an unexpected situation like
the rejected landing (Figure 3) than in a situation that
can be anticipated like the missed approach at
minimums (Figure 2).
It is also shown in Figures 4 and 5 that, as would be
expected, the reaction times are longer when the pilot
reaches for the aft switch first.   The question for the
FAA, manufacturers, and airline is whether the
slower reaction time is enough to result in serious
safety consequences.  In this case, we included the
missed approach and the rejected landing to be able
to compare routine and time-critical reaction times.
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Comparing Figures 4 and 5 shows that the pilots are
quicker to respond in a time-critical situation like the
rejected landing; however, the slower reaction times
when reaching first for the aft TOGA switch make
the safety ramifications of mixing these airplanes
worth questioning whether there are mitigation
strategies.  For example, in this case a design change
is one possible solution.  The results of this analysis
were  passed  on  to  the  manufacturer  and  they  are
determining the requirements for adding the TOGA
switch designed for the 767-400 to the 777.
We have shown through this study that a systematic
vulnerability analysis can add significant value to the
decision making required when determining the
feasibility of mixed-fleet flying of any two airplane
types or models.  Because of the value added, the
FAA and airplane manufacturer have requested that
we be involved in future mixed-fleet flying
assessments to perform the same type of analysis.
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